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Issues Presented
Whether there was a search and seizure which violated Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when
police officers entered a home without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances in
order to investigate a misdemeanor violation?
Whether subsequent evidence and admissions should be suppressed if
discovered shortly after an illegal search and seizure?

Statement of the Case
The prosecutor/respondent makes a huge showing of the fact that "there are
differences between the officers' recollections of what happened at the door."
Respondent's brief, p. 5. The respondent bases its entire first argument on the fact that
the door was not pushed open by the officers other than by the original knock.
However, this is not the case. Both officers clearly stated at the Suppression hearing
that the door was pushed open prior to making contact with the appellant.
Sergeant Jackson recollects, as stated by the respondent, that "Officer Steele
pushed open the door 'a little further,' 'maybe another foot or so.'" Respondent's
Brief, p. 5, cites omitted. However, the respondent also asserts that Officer Steele
recalls simply shining the flashlight into the apartment after the door initially swung
open. This is false. On cross-examination at the suppression hearing, Officer Steele
provided the following testimony:
Q.

But in fact you and Officer Jackson went ahead and opened the door
further, didn't you?

A.

Yeah, we might have, yeah.

Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 20-21.
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Summary of the Arguments
Respondent comes forth with two arguments in an attempt to justify the illegal
acts of the police in this case. The entire first argument is based upon the erroneous
assumption that the apartment door was not pushed open further by the police.
However, both officers specifically recollect and admit to pushing the door open further
than it originally opened when they knocked on the door. Therefore, the first argument
with its four points has no merit. An entry and search occurred, as admitted by the
respondent, when the police pushed open the dwelling's door without a warrant or
consent to enter.
The second argument of the respondent is completely based around the Court
finding blood alcohol levels to be an exigent circumstance worthy of a warrantless
home entry. This is not a valid exigent circumstance. The Supreme Court of the
United States and of Utah have repeatedly held that the home is the focus of the
protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 14. This constitutional
provisions are in place to prevent the police from violating the sanctity of the home
without just cause. In the instant case, if probable cause existed, a telephonic warrant
would have allowed quick access to the home without any alleged destruction of
evidence and without violation of constitutional rights. The appellant respectfully
requests that the Court hold that there are no exigent circumstances beyond hot pursuit
which justify a warrantless entry into a person's dwelling.
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Argument
A.

BOTH OFFICERS ADMIT PUSHING THE DOOR OPEN
FURTHER, THEREBY ILLEGALLY SEARCHING THE
APARTMENT.

Both of the police officers present at the scene in the instant case recall pushing
the door open further before illuminating the interior of the apartment. This is clearly a
search and an entry and is so admitted by the respondent. See, Respondent's Brief, p.
7, footnote 2; State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 1990).By entering the
apartment, the police officers were no longer at a lawful vantage point in order to
conduct a plain view search, and therefore, there search was prohibited by the Utah
Constitution, Article I, section 14.
The undisputed and uncontradicted evidence shows that the officers at the scene
actually pushed open the door after the door initially swung open from the officers'
knocking. This evidence makes the entire first argument of the respondent's brief
irrelevant. The police had already illegally entered the home without a warrant and
searched the premises without a warrant or consent. The entry occurred prior to
contacting the appellant and also before a search took place in turning on the flashlight
to illuminate the apartment's interior. The police searched from an unlawful vantage
point, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

B.

THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE CONSENT TO ENTER THE
HOME.

The appellant believes that all four points of the respondents first argument are
irrelevant because the police conducted an illegal search of the home by opening the
door to the apartment. The respondent argues that the appellant gave consent to the
questioning and evidence gathered inside her dwelling. Again, the appellant believes
3

that the illegal search was not cured by the alleged subsequent consent. State v.
Hargraves. 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991). Nevertheless, consent was not
given in the instant case under Utah law.
The only evidence on consent is that the appellant agreed verbally to speak with
the police. At that point, she began walking toward the police. The appellant gave no
consent for thepolice to enter the home and made no motions which would indicate to
the officers that there presence was welcome in the home. On the contrary, the
appellant was walking towards the police. This would seem to indicate that the
appellant was not willing to confront the police in the home.
As stated by the respondent, the City bears the burden of showing voluntary
consent to the search. The test is based upon totality of the circumstances surrounding
the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); State v.
Marshall. 791 R2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1990). Here, the police had already illegally
conducted a search, and disputed evidence indicates they may have been already inside
before the conversation took place. There is no evidence to show that consent was
voluntary, and none was supplied by the respondent at trial or in its brief. Therefore,
consent was not given, nor was it voluntary.
When an uninvited police officer enters a home without a warrant and begins
asking questions, answering those questions does not indicate an individual consented
to the entry. United States v. Wenzel. 485 F. Supp.. 481, 483 (D. Minn. 1980); State
v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992). The appellant was faced with two
uniformed and armed police officers shining flashlights into her dark apartment from an
unlawful vantage point. A simple "yeah" response to the officers' single question
should not be deemed voluntary consent.
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C.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS NOT A VALID
EXCEPTION FOR MAKING A WARRANTLESS ARREST
IN A HOME FOR A MISDEMEANOR.

The respondent, in its second argument, seeks to have the Court recognize that
evidence of intoxication be declared an exigent circumstance worthy of justifying a
warrantless home search and seizure. The appellant respectfully submits that this is not
the proper question to be answered by the Court on this appeal. Rather, the more
important question is whether a warrantless entry is justified on exigent circumstances
for a misdemeanor crime when there is no hot pursuit.
The respondent characterizes the present case as a "luke warm investigation"
which clearly does not meet the exigency standard of the hot pursuit doctrine
established in State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1991). Respondent's
Brief, p. 25. In Ramirez, the Court held hot pursuit would justify a warrantless entry
and arrest in a home for a misdemeanor charge. However, no Utah Court has held that
a warrantless entry into a home is allowed for a misdemeanor arrest based upon any
exigent circumstance other than hot pursuit.
Other jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, have
specifically answered this question. In Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 752-53
(1984), the Court held that "of those courts addressing this issue, most have refused to
permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes." The Court then cites cases
from Connecticut, Michigan, Illinois and South Dakota in support of this point. The
citations the Court gives for exceptions to this rule are both cases, where like in
Ramirez, arrests were made on misdemeanors committed in an officer's presence where
the exigent circumstances were based upon hot pursuit. The Court then states the
following:
The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without
necessarily approving any of these particular holdings or considering every
possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless
5

home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth amendment when
the underlying offense is extremely minor.
Welsh. 466 U.S. at 753.
Regardless of the type of offense at issue in Welsh, the Court penned the
foregoing quote after citing at least four cases which held that warrantless home arrests
for misdemeanors was a violation of Constitutional rights. Driving under the influence
is a serious offense and is treated as such across the country. However, this does not
give local police the right to ignore the Constitutional protections provided by our
governments and the Court system. Driving under the influence is a class B
misdemeanor in Utah. A crime which ranks far down on the scale of crimes as
classified by the Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-101 et seq. (1990). While not ignoring
the seriousness of the crime, the Utah legislature has made driving under the influence a
crime with a classification two steps less than the conveyance of real estate by a manied
man without his wife's consent or one step less than the taking of cable television
services without paying. See. Utah Code Ann. sections 76-6-516 and 76-6-409.3
(1990).
In other cases, Courts have held that exigent circumstances do not attach to
misdemeanor driving under the influence charges when the police have sought to use
this justification for a warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest. In State v.
Othoudt. 482 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1992), a police officer found the home of a couple
who had left the scene of an accident. The home was entered into without consent and
an arrest was made. The Court refused to find exigent circumstances as a rationale for
the driving under the influence arrest. In a similar case, the Court in Negaard v.
Commissioner of Public Safety. 500 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Minn. App. 1993), the Court
there held that "warrantless entry of a dwelling cannot be justified under the emergency
doctrine when the purpose of the entry is to arrest a defendant for an offense less than a
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felony." This quote came in response to the state's claim that a warrantless entry on
exigent circumstances was proper after an accident and probable cause to believe the
defendant was drunk.
Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The police bear a
heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify
warrantless searches or seizures. United States v. Santana. 427 U.S. 38, 42-43
(1976). Here, the respondent seeks a blanket rule that would recognize evidence of
intoxication as an exigent circumstance entitling the police to enter a home without a
warrant. The supporting rationale for this rule is that it allows a defendant to "consume
or claim to have consumed more alcohol during the interim between being report [sic]
to law enforcement and apprehension, thus tainting evidence of intoxication for use at
trial and frustrating law enforcement efforts." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. Our system
of justice is based upon the honesty of all involved. The Court should not deliver a
ruling which blatantly assumes that the citizens of its state would fail to be truthful.
Therefore, the Court should hold that dissipation of blood alcohol levels do not
constitute an exigent circumstance worthy of breaching the sanctity of the home when a
telephonic warrant is so easily and quickly available to law enforcement officers. This
course of action would allow an independent, neutral magistrate to permit the intrusion
with little, if any, evidence being lost or destroyed.

Conclusion
The police entered the appellant's dwelling upon pushing the door open further.
This illegal entry preceded an illegal seizure. Therefore, the police violated the
appellant's constitutional rights, and all evidence obtained by the police thereafter
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should be suppressed. The appellant therefore respectfully requests that the Court of
Appeals order suppression of all evidence obtained after the seizure of the appellant and
remand the case to the ttj^rcourt for a trial without the illegally obtained evidence.
DATED this IP day of October, 1993.

Michael J. Petro
Attorney for Defendant
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